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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-4247 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
           
 v. 
  
ASSANE FAYE 
Appellant 
______________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-15-cr-00151-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: RESTREPO, GREENBERG and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 3, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Following a jury trial, Assane Faye was convicted of embezzlement and mail 
fraud. On appeal, he raises a number of challenges to his conviction. For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm in part, vacate in part and remand for further proceedings. 
I 
 As we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we set out only the facts necessary 
for the discussion that follows. In 2009, Faye founded United Security and Police 
Officers of America (the “Union”) from which he embezzled more than $300,000 over a 
three-year period from March 2010 through August 2013. The embezzlement scheme 
took two forms: (1) Faye’s hiring of his former girlfriend, Khady Gueye, who received a 
salary and expenses but performed no work for the Union and (2) Faye’s repayment of 
fraudulent expense vouchers that he submitted to the Union. Faye also fraudulently 
obtained $7,364 in unemployment benefits from the New Jersey Department of Labor 
while employed by the Union. 
Faye’s personal relationship with Gueye ended in 1996, but in 2010 Faye hired 
Gueye as a consultant on the Union payroll, unbeknownst to Gueye. The consulting 
agreement called for Gueye to organize “unorganized security officers” at various sites 
throughout the state of New York and for her to report directly to Faye. App. 346. 
Although Gueye’s purported signature appears on the document, she did not in fact sign 
it or agree to provide any services to the Union. Despite her lack of experience in union 
organizing and limited English language skills, Faye told the Union’s executive board 
that Gueye was “highly recommended with extended experience in political and 
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community organizing.” App. 162. Faye did not tell the board of his prior personal 
relationship with Gueye.  
Over the course of her “employment” by the Union, Gueye received $244,169 in 
salary and reimbursements. During much of this time, Gueye was actually in Senegal, 
where she resided for approximately six months of every year. Faye was in fact the 
beneficiary of these funds; he systematically withdrew from the account in which 
Gueye’s salary was deposited. More than 90 percent of the deposited money was 
withdrawn from ATMs in Toms River, New Jersey, near Faye’s home, while Gueye lived 
90 miles away in New York City. The majority of the withdrawals occurred when Gueye 
was not in the United States.  
The second part of Faye’s embezzlement involved fraudulent expense vouchers. 
Faye had his own checkbook for the Union account, and he regularly disbursed funds 
under his own signature for what were supposed to be union-related business expenses. 
The majority of Faye’s fraudulent reimbursements involved mileage expense claims for 
his business-related travel. Faye submitted all expenses as if he had used a personal 
vehicle, for which he was entitled to mileage, when in fact he regularly used a rental 
vehicle, for which he was not. This resulted in a larger reimbursement than if he had 
submitted car rental and gasoline expenditures. Moreover, Faye repeatedly fabricated the 
actual mileage he reported on his vouchers, totaling $94,000 over a three-year period. 
Supp. App. 17-18. The Government presented a random sample of Faye’s submitted 
vouchers that it had analyzed with Google maps to show that the miles Faye claimed on 
his vouchers were significantly higher than the expected mileage. Records from 
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Enterprise Car Rental supported this finding: mileage Faye claimed on his vouchers was 
almost triple the mileage actually recorded on the vehicles he had rented. Faye also 
repeatedly billed the Union for domestic travel expenses during times when official 
customs records showed that he was actually outside of the country.  
Lastly, Faye applied for and received unemployment benefits from New Jersey 
from March 21, 2010 through June 27, 2010. During that time, although not yet receiving 
a salary, he was working as president of the Union and writing checks for business 
reimbursements to himself from the Union’s bank account. Faye also travelled to France 
in May 2010, which likewise rendered him ineligible to receive unemployment benefits 
during that time since he was neither looking nor available for work while travelling 
abroad. During the three relevant months, Faye improperly received a total of $7,364 
from the New Jersey Department of Labor. 
Faye was charged with nine criminal counts. Count One was embezzlement from 
the Union through improper salary and disbursements to Gueye; Count Two was 
embezzlement from the Union through false reimbursement vouchers; and Counts Three 
through Nine were mail fraud resulting from false representations to the State of New 
Jersey in Faye’s application for unemployment benefits. A jury convicted Faye on all 
nine counts. He was sentenced to a total of 37 months’ imprisonment followed by a 
period of supervised release. App. 3. The District Court also ordered Faye to pay 
$244,169.78 in restitution on Count One, $74,000 on Count Two, and $7,364 for Counts 
Three to Nine. Faye timely appealed. 
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II1 
On appeal, Faye advances four arguments. First, he contends that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict on Count Two. Second, he 
contends that there was also insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict on 
Counts Three through Five and Seven through Nine. Third, Faye contests the restitution 
order on several grounds. Finally, Faye asserts that the prosecutor’s comment during 
rebuttal summation lessened the Government’s burden of proving the crimes charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, amounting to prosecutorial misconduct. We will address each 
in turn.  
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Count Two) 
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, we exercise plenary 
review and uphold the conviction “if any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gibbs, 190 
F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Count Two charged Faye with unlawful conversion of union property in violation 
of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c).  Faye argues that the Government made its burden more stringent 
by adding an additional element in Faye’s indictment and then failed to offer sufficient 
evidence to establish that element. Specifically, Faye argues that by charging him with 
improper reimbursements “in excess of $100,000” in the indictment, the Government 
added an amount to the offense which was not sustained by the evidence presented at 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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trial. We disagree. The statute provides neither a dollar threshold nor differing degrees of 
criminal culpability based on the value of funds unlawfully converted. That the District 
Court instructed the jury as to the amount alleged in the indictment does not change the 
fundamental elements of the offense or the Government’s burden with respect thereto. 
Even assuming the jury instructions incorrectly referenced the amount, the Supreme 
Court in Musacchio v. United States made clear that sufficiency review is assessed 
against the actual elements of the offense, not against the elements contained in an 
erroneous jury instruction. 136 S. Ct. 709, 715 (2016). There was substantial evidence 
from which a rational jury could conclude that Faye’s fraudulent expense vouchers 
satisfied the essential elements of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c).  
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Counts Three through Nine) 
Counts Three through Nine charged Faye with mail fraud for his receipt of 
unemployment benefits from the State of New Jersey in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.2 
Faye contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding that his 
misrepresentations to the New Jersey Department of Labor were material to his receipt of 
unemployment benefits. This argument fails. An employee for the New Jersey 
Department of Labor testified at trial that an individual applying for unemployment 
benefits must be able, available and searching for work to be eligible for benefits. In his 
application, Faye falsely stated on seven separate occasions from March 27, 2010 through 
June 26, 2010 that he satisfied that criteria, when in fact he was working full-time to 
                                              
2 Faye does not challenge his conviction for mail fraud on Count Six as he admits 
to being out of the country and unavailable for work during that period. 
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establish the Union, even if not taking a salary at the time. This evidence was sufficient 
for a rational jury to find Faye’s statements material.  
C. Restitution  
Faye raises three challenges to the District Court’s restitution order. First, he 
argues that the District Court erred in ordering restitution for Counts One and Two under 
the Mandatory Victims’ Restitution Act (“MVRA”), rather than as a condition of 
supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Faye then argues that the District 
Court abused its discretion in the amount of the awards on Counts Two to Five and Seven 
to Nine. We review de novo whether an award of restitution is permitted under law, but 
we review specific awards for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bryan, 655 F.3d 232, 
253 (3d Cir. 2011). 
The parties agree, as do we, that the District Court erred in ordering restitution for 
Counts One and Two pursuant to the MVRA, which authorizes restitution for certain 
offenses under Title 18 and Title 21. Because Faye was convicted of an offense under 
Title 29, restitution ordered pursuant to the MVRA was improper. Rather, 8 U.S.C. § 
3583(d) is the proper authority for restitution in this case. Taken together, § 3583(b) and 
§ 3583(d), authorize the “federal courts to order restitution as a condition of supervised 
release for any criminal offense . . . for which probation is properly imposed.” United 
States v. Batson, 608 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2010). We will remand for resentencing to 
allow the District Court to consider whether to award restitution as a condition of 
supervised release on Counts One and Two. 
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Faye’s other arguments concerning the specific amounts in the restitution order are 
without merit. District courts have wide discretion to make a reasonable estimate of loss 
when ordering restitution. See United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2007). The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining based on the evidence presented 
at trial that $74,000 was a reasonable estimate of the Union’s loss for Count Two and 
$7,364 was a reasonable estimate of New Jersey’s loss for Faye’s fraudulently obtained 
unemployment benefits for Counts Three to Five and Seven to Nine. 
D. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Faye’s final argument concerns the alleged misconduct arising from a comment by 
the prosecutor during rebuttal summation. In an attempt to discount the many 
assumptions underlying the defense’s case, the prosecutor explained to the jury the 
concept of Occam’s razor, a “principle of problem solving,” which holds that the 
hypothesis with “fewest assumptions” is usually correct. App. 1698. Defense counsel 
objected on the grounds that the comment may have misled the jury by suggesting a 
lower standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. App. 1711. In response, the 
District Court asked defense counsel to draft a curative instruction clarifying the standard 
of proof and when she was unable to do so, the court provided one without objection 
from either party. App. 1712-15. Faye now argues on appeal that the prosecutor’s remark 
should have resulted in a mistrial. Since counsel did not object to the content of the 
curative instruction at trial, we review for plain error. See United States v. Brennan, 326 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). To establish plain error, the defendant must prove that there 
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is “(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights. United States v. 
Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2003). 
“The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the conduct ‘so infected the trial 
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process’ in light of the 
entire proceeding.”  United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(quotation omitted). In conducting this analysis, we consider, inter alia, the prosecutor’s 
improper actions and any curative instructions. Id. We reject Faye’s contention that the 
remark rose to the level of prosecutorial misconduct in light of the record as a whole. 
Any potential confusion caused by the comment was fully addressed by the District 
Court’s curative instruction, which instructed that “the burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is controlling over any analogy to the reference to the fewest 
assumptions.” App. 1716. The jury is presumed to follow the instructions given by the 
trial court. Hakim, 344 F.3d at 326. The District Court did not plainly err.  
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Faye’s convictions, vacate the restitution 
ordered pursuant to the MVRA and remand for resentencing so that the District Court can 
consider whether to award restitution as a condition of supervised release for Counts One 
and Two.  
